The Linguistic crucible: The Deuxième Congrès International des Linguistes as background for Hjelmslev’s theory of participative oppositions

oral presentation in Workshop: 110 L’Ecole linguistique de Genève: histoire et actualité (Claire FOREL et Christian PUECH)
THE LINGUISTIC CRUCIBLE: THE DEUXIEME CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DES LINGUISTES AS BACKGROUND FOR HJELMSLEV’S THEORY OF PARTICIPATIVE OPPOSITIONS (19th ICL, workshop 110)

1. Crossroads of circles

In this paper we will try to combine two different aspects: the major topic of the workshop 110 at the 19th ICL, concerning some issues about the European linguistic schools (“L’école linguistique de Genève: situation, histoire et actualité”) and the specific, historic-theoretical issue of our PhD thesis: the development of Hjelmslev’s idea of “participation”. The almost thirty-year period of elaboration of this idea, starting from the still intuitive hints given in his first major work Principes de Grammaire Générale (1928) up to some semantic implications sketched in one of his last papers Sémantique structurale (1959), takes place on a very interesting background: a continuous dialogue with the most representative exponents of the different European Linguistic Circles, which are typically assumed to be an historical product of Structuralism. Just on the contrary, we would like to claim that “Structuralism” itself may understood as a theoretical “construct” or as a label used to subsume under an uniform umbrella-concept a long-lasting debate made of different practices: theoretical trends, discussions, receptions, interpretations which resulted in the constitution of the so-called linguistic circles and in the series of International Congress of Linguists started in April 1928, at The Hague. In much the same way, the “theory of participative oppositions” demands to be understood as a small portion within this continual confrontation of thoughts on subtopics such as 1) the description of morphological categories, 2) the mutual relations between logic, grammar and psychology, 3) the link between natural and international, artificial language. By assuming such a background, some of the most controversial questions concerning “participation” could be explained: for instance, the very ambiguous proximity between participation and markedness turns out to be an issue concerning not quite the critical reception of glossematics and Prague’s morphonology respectively, but rather their very genetic stage (in casu Hjelmslev’s conception of the link between form and substance and his own ambiguous aptitude towards markedness, cf. Hjelmslev 1939).

2. Some pertinent issues at stake at the 2nd ICL

In describing the entire span of participation’s theory in Hjelmslev’s Glossematics one may note that the very first appearance of this idea is deeply rooted in a so-to-say “school-thought”: besides the explicit derivation of the term from the French sociology (Lévy-Bruhl), the theoretical system that this term underpins stems from the intersection of two particular écoles linguistiques: the school of Geneva and the school of Prague. The occasion for this intersection was the 2nd International Congress of Linguists (2nd ICL), which was held in Geneva from the 25th to the 29th August 1931. We will assume this particular edition as an interpretative “magnifying glass” in order to observe the intersection between those linguistic issues which were assumed to be of grounding importance for the
linguistique générale\(^1\) by the school of Geneva, and those ideas which formed the subterranean stream of Hjelmslev’s “underground river”\(^2\).

In Hjelmslev’s introductive note to his well-known work on *Structure générale des correlation linguistiques*, he claims that “Pour ces études j’avais reçu ensuite, pensant le 2\(^{\text{me}}\) Congrès international de linguistique tenu à Genève en 1931, un encouragement et une inspiration considérables par certains entretiens assez assez précis avec M. Serge Karcevskij et avec quelques autres membres” (Hjelmslev 1933: 57)\(^3\). This paper is hold to be the very beginning of the theory of participative oppositions – theory which includes the names of Karcevskij\(^4\), Jakobson and Troubetzkoy as its main sources. But we can also track down other, less evident references which may be pulled together in order to reconstruct the ideal theoretical framework for the development of “participation”: a constellation of names and ideas in which we may recover, among others, those of Bally, Sechehaye, Frei, Sapir, etc. Although the reconstruction we hereby propose may be understood as “fictional” – since (for the time being?) we don’t know if these specific ideas could have effectively elicited Hjelmslev’s attention or at which extent they have effectively contributed to the development of its theory –, such reconstruction can nevertheless claim a certain degree of evidence, since a) some of the aforementioned subtopics (§1) can be actually found as important theoretical ingredients in Hjelmslev’s correlations model, b) in the 1930s these ideas were already circulating and were explicitly inserted in the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) ICL agenda; c) they were also specifically discussed during the meetings of Copenhagen’s linguistic circle since its very foundation, on the 24\(^{\text{th}}\) of September 1931 (see Cigana 2014a, § 2.2). Their relevance seems thus to be confirmed.

For the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) ICL five major topics were proposed:

I\(^{\text{er}}\) question: Avez-vous quelque suggestion utile à présenter sur l’organisation du travail linguistique, sa technique et son outillage?

II\(^{\text{e}}\) question: Quel est, selon vous, le rôle à attribuer, dans le devenir et l’évolution des langues (en particulier dans la constitution des langues unifiées), d’une part aux phénomènes spontanés et à l’inconscient, de l’autre aux interventions de la volonté et de la réflexion? Subsidiairement: Que pensez-vous de l’adoption d’une langue internationale?

III\(^{\text{e}}\) question: Les systèmes phonologiques, envisagés en eux-mêmes et dans leurs rapports avec la structure générale de la langue.

IV\(^{\text{e}}\) La famille indo-européenne dans ses rapports avec d’autres familles de langues.

V\(^{\text{e}}\) Les enquêtes dialectologiques (ADCIL: 251-252).

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1. As Puech and Forel have clearly pointed out, it was the linguistic school of Geneva “qui organisait le deuxième Congrès international des linguistes en 1931, et qui diffusait la locution « linguistique générale », aujourd’hui remise en cause où en concurrence avec d’autres dénominations” (Puech, Forel 2013, *L’Ecole linguistique de Genève : situation, histoire et actualité* – http://www.eil19.org/ateliers/colelo-linguistique-de-geneve-histoire-et-actualite/).

2. This is the way Caputo (2003: 8; 2010: 85) labels Hjelmslev’s theory of participation.

3. “For this studies I’ve received, during the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) International Congress of Linguistics held in Geneva in 1931, significant support and considerable inspiration by some very detailed talks with Sergej Karevskij and some other members of Prague’s Linguistic Circle” [my translation].

4. A name which stands evidently out for his role of mediation between Prague and Geneva: there have been even some attempts to link Karcevskij to Geneva linguistic school (cf. Leška 1994: 82).
Above all the other issues, the second and the third ones testify an increasing interest in Prague’s freshly established phonologic theory and in some implications of “saussurean” model: they seem to be more “complexes”, including more hints for the debate. Let us reformulate both of them in the light of two main focal points:

a. the constitution of unified languages (langues unifiées or standardisées): creation, manipulation and development of artificial koinés or linguistic standards and the resulting issue concerning the linguistic, sociological or psychological mechanism which lies beyond their formation, that is the role of the so-called “subconscious thought” and its physiological counterpart, the “automatism” (cf. also Frýba-Reber 1994: 167, note 30), in relation to the faculté du langage, to language itself and to its evolution – an issue, we see, whose discussion does recall directly the more wide question about logic, psychology and grammar;

b. the relations between linguistic levels: the relationship between morphology and syntax, the criteria for their rationalization, the risks associated with a “phonologization” of morphology.

During the Congress these subtopics received different answers: we would like to sum up some most relevant interventions concerning these two ground ideas. It is quite clear that Hjelmslev’s development of the participative model at the turn of the 1930s did include the two components of psychological reflection concerning natural, linguistic thought as opposite to normative, artificial logic (a) and the more grammatical issue about morphological structure (b). Let us see how.

a) About the first “psychological” issue:

Léonce Roudet discuss the problem of a shared, uniform terminology from a linguistic point of view, i.e. dealing with the problem of Saussure’s distinction between motivated and unmotivated elements within language. He reformulates the very notion of motivated element asserting that “sont motivé tout mot et toute forme qui apparaissent comme résultant de l’emploi d’un procédé linguistique général. Les mots et les formes qui ne présentement pas ce caractère sont immotivés”. The question about the link between this distinction and the logical nature of grammatical categories, leads Roudet to assert that Aristotelian categories of thought could have been established only through a selection and rationalisation of grammatical categories, so that it is always possible to deduce the first ones from the second ones but not vice versa. In these assertions we can recognise Heinrich Maier’s thesis (1896-1900, 1908) about the original linguistic nature of logical categories, concepts and operations – a thesis which would have been quoted many times by Hjelmslev himself.

L. Jordan, from Munich (ADCIL: 22-25) discussed the very notion of “consciousness” and its degrees (subconsciou and unconscious) with special regard to the problem of linguistic laws and its exceptions: since the use of this terminology has caused many misunderstandings in respects to concepts such as

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5 “Aristote et d’autres philosophes ont établi les catégories de la pensée par un travail, conscient ou inconscient, de sélection et de rationalisation des catégories du langage, mais il est impossible de suivre la marche inverse et de déduire les secondes des premières” (ADCIL: 47).
“necessity”, “instinct”, “law”, “originality” (what we now would probably call “creativity”) he proposed an interesting reformulation: “consciousness” has to be intended as the clear line of our reflexion; “unconscious” is all that cannot at any rate (sous aucune condition) become conscious, that is all that lies below the threshold of consciousness without having the possibility to emerge; “subconscious” is instead the reservoir of conscience, namely all that may become conscious by means of reflection or association. So, in order to be able to explicate the nature of both social rules and phonetic laws, we have to distinguish the concepts of law (maximum degree of necessity by which no deliberate intervention nor original action is possible) and rule, which entails always some exception. In this perspective, Tarde’s so-called loi d’imitation turns out to be a rule, not a law, since a small edge of modification is always admitted (for instances, the alteration brought forth by the alternation of generations, communities, groups and so on). The so-called imitation law has thus to be intended as a bundle of rules whose action is nor conscious neither unconscious but lies within the degrees of consciousness6 (= le “non inconscient”). Jordan resolves in negating the existence (or better said, the pertinence) of the unconscious, since, with exception of the internal movements, “l’homme ne fait pas de mouvements qui réussissent sans théorie”: human psychic functions related to language does not happen without an even small degree of reflection. In conformity to different levels of conscience, Jordan postulates different levels of regularity even for phenomena which are normally understood to be irregular or deviant. According to Jordan, some teleological tendency grants sort of an evolutionary process leading to a maximal degree of linguistic development which coincides with a maximal degree of conscience: “il va sans dire que pleine conscience et langue unifiée coïncident”.

By the way this aptitude was shared by A. Piechowski from Moscou (ADCIL: 74-75), according to whom the evolution of both natural and unified languages follows an inverse proportion between will and reflexion (+) and unconscious phenomena (+), and by Hans Bauer (“Ein absolutes Maximum [des Bewussten und Gewollten] würde sich ergeben bei der Einführung einer künstlichen Hilfssprache ...”), who distributes linguistic levels from a maximum of conscious activity (lexicology and word-choice) and its minimum (syntax). In a second intervention (ADCIL: 148-149), Jordan pointed out that although in ancient times logic was deeply rooted in doctrinal grammar, during the 19th century the “objective (non-doctrinal) linguistics” noticed that languages don’t develop according to a logical order, whence the divorce of linguistics from logic. According to Jordan, if doctrinal, normative grammar cannot directly guarantee the logical order of thought, linguistics can guarantee this order indirectly. Jordan stresses the importance of a critic analysis of ideas-formation, for which a distinction between pure, logical thought (“la pensée dite libre ou pure”) and a logic which is derived from linguistics (“la logique sortie de la linguistique”) shall be adopted. Although this differentiation could easily be linked to Hjelmslev’s own distinction of 1928, aimed at establishing the link between language and ordinary natural thought, it shall be noted that it rests upon the distinction between concrete (things) and abstract (functions between things) and the priority accorded to the concrete, empirical dimension: an approach which is

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6 “La différence dans les fonctions de l’homme est formée pas les degrés de conscience. Il va sans dire que pleine conscience et langue unifiée coïncident” (ADCIL: 25).
clearly opposite to Hjelmslev’s, and more in general, to “structuralistic” (more precisely: gestalt-psychological, carnappian, etc.) point of view.

O. Jespersen (ADCIL: 77) remarked that in all natural languages there is something “artificial”, which is consciously introduced by the individual into the linguistic frame and which is then adopted by the mass: for examples, all “normative” aspects which can be found in orthography and pedagogical grammars. An international language, designed explicitly by linguists and psycholinguists, should be built up on scientific ground in order to achieve a maximum degree of easiness and efficacy: phonetic and morphologic components should be as regular as possible without any redundancy or overlapping. Jespersen seems thus to represent the “optimistic pole” of this debate.

Ch. Bally (ADCIL: 92-93) stressed that the tendency to approximate artificial language (langue artificielle) to natural languages (langues naturelles) has often been accomplished by disregarding the fact that natural languages are naturally irregular. Furthermore, an artificial language cannot be adequately established without adopting a general point of view, since we don’t know the exact role of typological features in fulfilling linguistic needs, which may vary according to different families.

H. Frei (ADCIL: 93-94) assumes that any language retains synchronically a certain degree of traditional elements linked to others whose function completely reveal itself only in a forthcoming state: an international oriented language, whose goal is to support the development of a forthcoming international civilisation, should be based on the latter kind of linguistic elements. It is nevertheless clear that Frei is talking about broadly-common languages (langues communes) such as Pidgin, Sabir and Creole, and not about international artificial languages (langues artificielles internationales) such as Esperanto, whose formation “répond [...] au caractère rationaliste d’une époque où la volonté réfléchie cherche à avoir prise sur des institutions traditionnelles qui lui avaient échappé jusqu’à présent, comme c’est le cas pour le langage” (ADCIL: 93).

E. Sapir (ADCIL: 86) discusses the very notion of “artificial”, a term which “does not do psychological nor historical justice to such constructed languages as those in current use. They are artificial in no profounder sense than that in which the technique of an opera singer is ‘artificial’ as compared with the more unconscious technique of a folk-singer” (ADCIL: 87). And yet the considerations of those (Sausser in primis, as it seems) who remain more sceptical about the chances for artificial languages to settle as they are within communities of speakers do not rely on an a priori argument, concerning the very structure of natural vs. artificial languages, but on a so-to-speak a posteriori argument, concerning the empirical conditions of such an establishment, namely the difficulties and alterations these languages have to face de facto in being adopted, utilised and spread, entering a proper historical dimension.

7 “Or tous les systèmes récents se fondent sur le type «européen»; il n’est pas prouvé que ce soit l’idéal pour les non-européens” (ADCIL: 92).
It is precisely for this reason, in fact, that R. James Kellog \( (ADCIL: 77-79) \) remains more sceptical about the possibilities for an artificial language to win international acceptance. His reasons were very clearly expressed as follows:

Many living languages have in their time been accepted as international auxiliary languages, and some have become and now are primary international languages; no dead language and no artificial language has ever been so accepted; actual international languages, therefore, have always had the same constituent aspects as the national vernaculars. The failure of any artificial language to win acceptance as an international language cannot rest on unfitness of its materials and mechanism, but seems to be due to: (1) lack of the basic aspects of speech and (2) consequent want of touch with life and (3) the resultant weakness and instability noted above; (4) the unrealized magnitude of the task of establishing an international or world language and (5) the inevitable resultant delay and discouragement; (6) the competition of rival artificial languages; (7) the pre-emption of the field by the already establish international languages, which (8) are better equipt [sic] and circumstanced to serve as world languages, and (9) have already made many generations of progress toward this goal \( (ADCIL: 79) \).

b) Concerning the topic of “general linguistics”, Karcevskij’s and Sechehaye’s contributions seem to be particular relevant:

S. Karcevskij, who summarised his theoretical positions concerning linguistic system and its structuring. A linguistic system is a mechanism whose functioning consists in associating two classes of differences: those regarding the domain of thought, and those regarding the domain of sound \( (ADCIL: 114) \). A linguistic system is thus a four-layered totality including lexicology, syntax, morphology and phonology; each of these planes should be intended as a permeable “stage” (he speaks of “étapes ou plans de transmission”) arranged fluidly within two extremes: the conceptual and the phonic aspect of language. This articulation led him to assert the deep interdependence between morphology and syntax \( (ADCIL: 154-155) \) against the strict and irrevocable autonomy of syntax proposed by Brøndal \( (ADCIL: 153) \), Jespersen and Belić \( (ADCIL: 154-155) \). In conflict with this interpretation, we find Karcevskij and Sechehaye siding together, both of them arguing the pointlessness of reproaching the fact that morphological elements are often “overcharged” by many syntactic (but also semantic) values: just on the contrary, this should be intended as a normal and structural feature of semiological living systems (“systèmes sémiologiques vivantes”) – even more, according to Karcevskij homonymy and synonymy constitute a general semiological principle called “du dualisme asymétrique” \( (cf. \text{Karcevskij} \; 1929) \); they are thus “deux principes réglant le fonctionnement de tous les faits sémiologiques” \( (ADCIL: 155) \). Answering to Pos \( (ADCIL: 156-157) \), Karcevskij explains that homonymy and synonymy have both to be understood as two sides of the same phenomenon and that there cannot be absolute synonymy/homonymy, since no sign can replace another one under any circumstance. On the other hand, even if there cannot be a perfect match of two circumstances, a subsumption under a same class shall nevertheless always be possible. So there is always a slight degree of correspondence (and, conversely, there is always a degree of non-coincidence) between linguistic signs and their functions (“dans un système sémiologique vivant [...] chaque signe doit être capable d’avoir
n+1 fonctions et qu’inversement une même situation doit pouvoir s’exprimer par n+1 signes”). In his main intervention, Karcevskij sketched out his four-layered system, describing the specific, mutual subdivisions each plane imposes on the others. As he already stressed in his *Système du verbe russe* (1927) he claims that any semiological subdivision follows a general oppositional criterion: any distinction and differential value (no matter which kind) are binary or ternary – that is: they have to be understood as a result of a logical opposition between positive and negative ideas or between a positive, a negative and a neutral idea. For instance, this is the case of syntactical relationships, which can be divided into syntagmatic and asyntagmatic relations, each of which can be further articulated into three different variants; respectively: *accord, rectio* or *adjunction*, and *coordination, subordination* or *aside*. This articulation seems to rely upon Bally’s syntactical theory of determinant and determined terms (T and T’) and it is set up so that if *accord* is “A”, then *rectio* is “B” and *adjunction* is “neither A nor B”; in the same way, if *coordination* implies reversibility of terms (A), *subordination* implies irreversibility of terms, (B) and *aside* neither reversibility nor irreversibility, thus *indifference* (neither A nor B). As we will see, this last feature was meant to exercise a deep influence on hjelmslevian thought.

Sechehaye remarks three distinctions to be made: 1) between the phrase, psychological unity of *parole*, and its structure, belonging to *langue*; 2) between logical and psychological, “imaginative” elements, the latter including the former in a sort of intuitive state from which logical elements have to free themselves – a theory which Sechehaye called “de l’emboîtement”; 3) between a “narrow syntax”, concerning word-radicals – a domain more subject to imagination – and “large syntax”, which concerns the phrase’s structure and is more logic-oriented. So it happens that morphology and syntax constitute a two-fold graduated layer between the two opposite poles of imagination and logic.

3. Combining the issues

Let us now sum up all these ideas in the light of Hjelmslev’s (possible) stance within the aforementioned debate:

i) In 1928, Hjelmslev’s theoretical operation of identifying an autonomous field for his general grammar consist in marking the specific features of its object: language has nothing to do with normative logic nor with its “orthological” version (the rules taught by scholastic grammar), but relies on a) *prelogical* and b) *subcognitive* structure (*PGG*: 22-24). These considerations lead to a modular conception of grammar, whose place is within psychology rather than logic. In order to gain a general perspective, linguistic has to give up an extrinsic and imperative idea of norm and to assume on the contrary a pure descriptive asset. This is due to the fact that only a descriptive asset, along with a psychological-indirect method, can grasp the peculiar patterns of linguistic thought, based on purely unreflected, automatic, mnemonic associative facts (*PGG*: 24, note 1) – in other words, language does contain “illogical” elements (for instance, the so-called “concrete categories” of space which are linked to lévy-bruhlian prelogic feature, interjections, “gestes

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8 See *PGG*: 264-265.
vocaliques”, phonetic symbolism, *etc.*) which may be expunged from linguistic consideration only at the cost of “immanence”. Hjelmslev’s source for this considerations, a part from Wundt and the psychological school of Herbart, is Henri Delacroix

auteur particulièrement apprécié per l’école de Genève, qui dans *Le langage et la pensée* compare l’automatisme de la langue à celui d’un autre système sémiologique, la musique: «Toute organisation repose ainsi sur un système d’automatismes que l’acte déclenche, sur un langage et les lois de ce langage [...]. Les ensembles se construisent grâce aux automatismes de toute espèce qui mettent les éléments à la disposition de la synthèse constructive » (390) (Frýba-Reber 1994: 167, note 30).

We may very well assume that it was Sechehaye’s work which introduced Hjelmslev to Delacroix’s theory: as a matter of facts, in his *Programme et méthodes* (1908), Sechehaye had already stressed the attention on the “illogical” elements connected with automatism and instinctive actions precisely through a double hypothesis concerning “l’automatisme dans le fonctionnement de la langue et [...] l’imperfection congénitale de la langue dont il a été question à propos de la polémique avec Brondal” (Frýba-Reber 1994: 166). By this two-fold hypothesis, Sechehaye postulated a “friction” to be found between language’s social-collective and individual components, so that linguistic agreement is far from being a perfected, harmonized and “rationalised” *consensus* but an interplay between social resistance or conservatism and individual, communicative issues. Much in this sense, according to Hjelmslev, linguistic *consensus* has nothing to do with the passive accetpation of imperative rules but it rather rests upon an *average* (a “Spielraum”) which results from all the different tendencies manifested by the *actes de parole* – and it is thus an *consciously uncontrollable* collective product.

In this perspective, Hjelmslev’s use of the notion of automatism seems to follow the same goal as Sechehaye’s: it allowed him not only to bring language closer to the psychological (psycho-physiological) domain in opposition to that of pure logic, but also to assume that language is always dynamically positioned between free, voluntary, arbitrary choice and a deeper collectively motivated, individually-risen reservoir of forms. Natural speakers are said to be able to spontaneously tap into deep linguistic structures (the morphosyntactic level, for instance), and to be “more free” to concentrate their attention on the choice of elements which are semantically more evident or syntactically “larger” (the lexical level, for instance). Thus, far from being a bunch of constrictive rules, grammatical categories can be understood as extremely flexible tools which can be bent with no to little effort for particular, individual expressive needs (*cf.* PGG: 234). In fact, Hjelmslev’s “ quasi-saussurean” 10 reformulation of the notions of linguistic *consensus* and *norm* led him to believe the vagueness of grammatical categories to be a functional feature for the

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9 Only in 1934 Hjelmslev specifies that with the term “subconscious” he had intended that linguistic facts are both of psycho-collective and sociological nature. This naturally means that we are facing Hjelmslev’s theoretical struggle to establishing the relationship between parole, langue and *faculté du langage*: to say that language is subconscious means only that subconscious (potentially conscious) facts is only the material (physiological) correlate of linguistic immanent facts, which may be described as such (*cf.* Cigana 2014b).

10 We use this term with all the necessary reservations (*cf.* Cigana 2014b).
expression/formation of both collective and individual representations. Since language structurally forms any kind of content, whether conceptual, perceptual or emotional (cf. PGG: 23-24, note 6)\(^{11}\), an exact differentiation between logical and affective constituents is not always possible and may even be futile — or better said: a mixture of affective and logical elements has always to be taken for granted:

Il est, selon nous, dangereux d'établir d'avance une distinction entre des éléments grammaticaux d'un côté et certains autres qu'on appelle extra-grammaticaux, de l'autre [cf. Sechehaye, *Programme et méthode*, p. 53], entre un langage intellectuel et un langage affectif [cf. *Id*, p. 129].

Actually, Hjelmslev's critique was not-well addressed, since the opinion he is trying to refute belongs rather to Bally; as Fryba-Reber (1994: 130) has clearly shown, Sechehaye's metaphor of the “penumbra of ideas” (p. 121)\(^{12}\) was further explained in a more “blended” sense by Sechehaye himself in a letter to Bally:

> La question est de savoir si ce phénomène est d'origine purement affective. C'est ce dont je ne suis pas persuade. Il est vrai que tout ce qui est clair dans la langue a un caractère intellectuel; mais ce qui l'entoure n'est pas nécessairement affectif. C'est de l'intellectuel en devenir. Cela implique l'affectif, mais cela implique autre chose aussi, l'imaginatif par exemple et aussi la simple imprécision (Lettre à Ch. Bally, 23 nov. 1913) [cit. in Fryba-Reber, 1994: 130].

Hjelmslev seems to share precisely this point of view: there is no dividing line between these two components, but always co-articulation, mutual permeation between affective and rational issues, between collective and individual representations. Language is said to be constituted by collective, subconscious ideas which are able to respond to individual needs and whose nature is hybrid, since they are demanded to form human experience in its wholeness. It follows that the opposition between normative and descriptive approach of general grammar does reproduce a mereological proportion between a whole and one of its part, which tends to be wrongfully overestimated in relation to other constitutive aspects: the priority of logic in relation to affective, emotive, stylistic elements and of rigid, consciously “controllable” patterns in relation to profound, vague and permeable (“prelogical”) interplay of categories are but of two examples of it.

There is just another one fallacy: that which overestimate the normative idea of correctness (“Sprachrichtigkeit”) above a goal-free usage of linguistic structures. Just on the contrary, and by virtue of his elastic (immanent?) conception of linguistic norm, Hjelmslev seems to be more inclined to a purely descriptive approach towards “errors”. Those irregularities or usage-deviations, which from a normative point of view are to be ruled out from linguistic pattern’s pertinence, are said to

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11 The germ of the so-called linguistic “omniformativity” seems to have been established.

12 According to which precise ideas are said to constitute the centre of this projected penumbra (“un noyau parfaitement dessiné [...] les pensées claires qui vont trouver leur expression correcte dans la grammaire”) while vague and fuzzy ideas constitute its edge (“une pénombre plus ou moins grande tout autour [...]qui représente des choses plus pressenties que pensées, de vagues associations, des concepts en gestation, des mouvements émotifs qui ne se traduisent pas en idées bien définies”) This metaphor which strongly resembles Steinthal’s concerning the “deformed reflections” which constitute linguistic ideas — a metaphor well-known and quoted by Hjelmslev himself (cf. PGG: 26-27).
retain an informative value since they can be a symptomatic expression of the
constitutive (not constrictive) nature of grammatical system: every category is broad
(general, abstract) enough to support a large number of particular (concrete) usages
and manifestations (variants). Errors and irregularities may be in contrast to some
rules, but may very well respond to others, whether still unknown, conflicting, more
adequate or simply deposited on deeper linguistic strata (cf. “Les éléments dits extra-
grammaticaux ou affectifs peuvent en effet obéir aux règles grammaticales, en partie
peut-être à des règles grammaticales qu’on n’a pas encore réussi à dégager”, PGG:
240). No aprioristic or dogmatic recall on linguistic rules can claim imperative power
in deciding what is correct and what it is not – properly said, there is not even such
a strict binaristic alternative: in the first phase of Hjelmslev’s thought, there can be
only an empirically oriented subsumption of particular issues (including the
consideration of the speaker’s “sentiment linguistique”) into general, comparatively
established classes. This approach, which shows quite a resemblance with some
guidelines of Frei’s thesis about linguistic déficits\(^{13}\), would become very clear and
relevant once the participative theory concerning the prelogical game between
intensive and extensive terms had been sketched out\(^{14}\). We are now able to sketch out
Hjelmslev’s approach towards the debate between natural vs. artificial language,
which can be very well deduced from the premises hereby given\(^{15}\) and which was in

\(^{13}\) There are some relevant differences yet: Frei states the pertinence of “errors” (the discrepancies
between popular and official French, that is, in Hjelmslev’s words, between two usages of the same
pattern) on a teleological perspective: the five needs he enumerates constitute the basic
subconscious drives that “orient” speakers in committing these errors. Hjelmslev’s approach seems
to be remarkably similar, although the rather struggles towards an antiteleological perspective: some
evidences may be found in the psychological needs for stability and communication (and their
implications) he put on the bottom of linguistic synchronic state. In his personal, annotated copy of
PGG he refers twice to a “tendency among the population” (tendens hos befolkningen) and of an
“unconscious need” (désir inconscient) quoting Meillet’s Introduction à l’étude comparative des langues
indoeuropéennes (1922). In his Sprogystem og Sprogforandring (1934), he seems to have overturned his
perspective: speaking of a sapirian notion of internal “tendency” (drift) he tries to introduce the
causes of linguistic change within pattern and in an “de-psychologised” form.

\(^{14}\) We cannot discuss much further this topic, but an example will clear this point: if we ask an
Italian speaker to state the correctness of the two Italian forms “credo che è” vs. “credo che sia”, the
indicative form would probably be marked as the uncorrected one, in accordance with scholastic,
pedagogic “orthological” grammar, while the other one would be marked as incorrect tout court or,
at best, as a form which is slowly taking hold – and yet, from a descriptive point of view we cannot
but to assume that the indicative form does constitute a possible complement for the independent
verb: being neither correct nor incorrect, it belongs to an actual trend in usage. Furthermore, this
“error” might be assumed as symptomatic construction of Italian grammatical category of “mood”:
as a matter of facts, the opposition between indicative and subjunctive seems to follow the
opposition between unmarked and marked terms respectively. Thus, the apparent irregularity in use
may reproduce a regularity within structure: extensive/unmarked terms may very often replace
intensive/marked terms even in the same syntagmatic environment. Such an argument seems to be
the morphological equivalent of Troubetzkoy’s study on “orthographical” errors in some
documents of ancient ecclesiastic Slavic: “une faute d’orthographe revient souvent dans ces textes,
la substitution d’une voyelle à une autre là où il y a conditionnement extragrammatical mais c’est
toujours la voyelle de la série non palatale qui est mise à la place de la voyelle de la série palatale,
jamais l’inverse. L’hypothèse de variantes équivalentes n’explique pas la régularité de la
substitution. Au contraire, si on émet l’hypothèse que pour la conscience linguistique slave de
l’époque la série non palatale était la série fondamentale et la série palatale la série accessoire, le sens
des fautes d’orthographe s’explique parfaitement [...] La notion de marque avait intégré le
paradigme linguistique pour ne plus le quitter” (Viel 1984: 88-89).

\(^{15}\) Hjelmslev’s enthusiastic aptitude towards Jensen’s nature method is another evidence of that.
any way expressed in 1941, in the paper *Et par sprogteoretiske betragtninger*: any normative, “oligarchic” attempt to manipulate linguistic structure is always possible but it is also generally doomed to fail, just as any artificial language is doomed to be subjected to a blind readjustement. Speakers’ community, that is: collective, “subconscious” approval, has the last word in accepting, modifying or refuting those element which were forced into linguistic structure\(^\text{16}\). In Hjelmslev’s words:

> Dr. Sven Clausen har bedt mig udtale mig 1) om »spørgsmålet om muligheden av en bevidst språgrøkt« [...]. Det forudgående er præmisser til en besvarelse af disse to spørgsmå, og konklusionen er nu let at drage: 1) en bevidst sprogrogt er mulig i ubegrenset omfang, saa længe den ikke søger at antaste det, der ovenfor er kaldt sprogbygningen, men holder sig til sprogbrugen [...] (Hjelmslev 1941: 87)\(^\text{1}\).

There is one last feature concerning the “psychological”, or rather anti-normative component of participation we would like to stress: in pointing out the “illogical” (in 1933 and 1934 Hjelmslev will have said also “alogical”, although the term commonly utilised will still become “prelogical” or “sublogical”\(^\text{18}\)), subconscious structure of language, we may recognise Hjelmslev intention to side linguistic and grammar with psychology in opposition not only to normative logic but also to (at least Durkheim’s) sociology: linguistic laws do not resemble social imperative rules (*PGG*: 19) just as grammatical categories are not quite understandable as social imperatives forces since they are said to be far more subtle and fundamental (cf. Cigana 2014a). It is worth mentioning that the opposition between psychology and sociology does not reflect the opposition between individual vs. collective side of language: general grammar both demands and allow a collective, empirical and indirect psychology. This theoretical move concentrates a long-lasting debate\(^\text{19}\) whose main players are Tarde, Pareto, Weber, Meillet, Lévy-Bruhl, Mauss, Durkheim, Delacroix, Van Ginneken, Bally himself (cf. Forel 2008): by the way, these latter (along with Petre Andrei, Emile Setâlă, Badouin de Courtenay, J. Rozwadowski) were explicitly mentioned by Hjelmslev (*PGG*: 283, notes 3-4) in order to support his hypothesis of sociological point of view being a variant of psychological perspective.

ii) Between 1928 and the beginning of the 1930’s, Hjelmslev’s “psycho-linguistic” considerations about language’s deep structure run parallel with his interest in


\(^{17}\) “Dr. Sven Clausen has asked me to speak 1) about the “issue concerning the possibility of a conscious linguistic standardisation” [...]”. What has been said constitute the premises for answering these two questions, and the conclusion is now easy to draw: 1) a deliberate linguistic standardisation is completely possible as long as it doesn’t seek to interfere with what we have called above the “linguistic structure but sticks to language usage” [my translation]. We have elsewhere stressed the proximity between Hjelmslev’s and Saussure’s argumentation concerning artificially-induced linguistic modifications vs. natural language as such (Cigana 2014b).

\(^{18}\) Hjelmslev’s use of the notion of “sublogic”, his “genial invention” (cf. Rasmussen 1992: 109), may be understood as an attempt to combine the subconscious component of language (in both its meanings of 1. automatic, mnemonic mechanism and of 2. diffused, “collectivised” structure; in one word: language’s individual-resilient feature) with the fact that language forms thought and has thus its own pattern, its own “logic”. This is only an hypothesis of ours and has thus to be assumed as such.

\(^{19}\) To what extent Hjelmslev was aware of it has yet to be seen.
morphology, and more precisely on the question about which law regulates the internal distribution of members within grammatical categories – in fact, morphology is said to represent the very core of linguistic structure. Within the morphological research about the so-called “concrete categories”, the theory of participation finds its genetic ground:

 Après la parution de mon livre publié en 1928, Principes de grammaire générale, j’avais surtout, dans le domaine de la grammaire générale, orienté mes études vers le problème de la structure générale des catégories morphématiques (Hjelmslev 1933: 57).

This remark seems to be particularly relevant, since it shows how the idea of a system being composed only by negative, relative and oppositional “values” was received and disputed: Karcevskij had already identified some difficulties in the overwhelming number of oppositions and had stressed the need of having positive elements to be registered alongside of pure relations. His very notions of synonymy and homonomy were fashioned so that they could explain the interplay between positive and negative qualities, and between a large system and its smaller subsystems (séries). Hjelmslev’s idea of correlations seems to have somewhat taken charge of this conception: the need to narrow a purely oppositional system into series became the requisite of defining the exact extent of these smaller classes. Such a requisite inaugurated Hjelmslev’s inquiry about the “possible number and mutual (co)relations of morphemes within one and the same paradigm” (“... nombre possible et rapport mutuels des morphèmes à l’intérieur d’un seul et même paradigme”, ibid.).

And yet, his own claims about subconscious, “illogique” linguistic structure seems not to combine optimally with this kind of investigations. How to come out? First of all, a stable and “rational” ground for linguistic vagueness was to be found. As a matter of facts, besides Jakobson and Troubetzkoy’s idea of asymmetrical oppositions, Hjelmslev drew upon Karcevskij’s idea of a logical articulation of linguistic categories into binary or ternary subdivisions: this articulation is said to constitute the main intuition concerning the logical aspect of language, i.e. a necessary but not sufficient “point d’Archimède” which allows the prelogical and vague comportment of members to be analytically registered. In Hjelmslev’s words:

Pour vraiment expliquer les faits de langue, il faut tenir compte de leur nature spécifique, sans perdre de vue un seul instant leur caractère illogique ou alogique possible; mais d’autre part il ne faut pas en rester là; il faut trouver un point de repère logique qui permette à notre intelligence d’enregistrer les faits (Hjelmslev 1933: 70).

As a matter of facts, in setting up the so-called “notional zone” of each grammatical category, Hjelmslev explicitly follows Karcevskij’s indications: a zone

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20 Cf. Karcevskij 1927: 13-14, note 2: “Il est devenu lieu commun d’affirmer que les valeurs linguistiques n’existent qu’en vertu de leur oppositions entre elles [...]. L’opposition pure et simple conduit nécessairement à un chaos et ne peut pas servir de base à un système. La vraie différenciation suppose une ressemblance et une différence simultanées. Les faits pensés forment des séries fondées sur un élément commun et ne s’opposent qu’à l’intérieur de ces séries. Ces séries, à leur tour et suivant le même principe, sont membres des séries d’ordre supérieur, et ainsi de deux valeurs appartenant à deux séries différentes et éloignées se trouvent avoir un même signe phonique”. 
should be logically articulated into two or three areas governed respectively by a contradictory or a contrary opposition, although only the contrary opposition can be generalised in order to obtain a common logical matrix, still independent from any semantic investment. One aspect of a far more complex theory was thus established once for all—a logical “ballot paper” (*Stemmesedde*: Hjelmslev 1942/43: f. 98), consisting of three fields \((a, b, c)\), for the registration of the prelogical behaviour of linguistic basic elements:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
  a & + \\
  c & 0 \\
  b & \div \\
\end{array}
\]

According to the schema, \(a\) = represent an idea whatsoever; \(b\) = its contrary; \(c\) = a tertium, so neither the first nor the second, thus indifference (note that \(c\) can also be arranged with \(a\) or \(b\) in order to get a contradictory opposition).

In any case, as said, such a “zone” represents the necessary but not sufficient condition for describing the mutual relation of linguistic elements: although being useful in visualising their peculiar prelogical vagueness, the logical patterns therein represented (contrary opposition \([a : b]\) and contradictory correlation \([a : \text{non-}a]\)) cannot constitute them, nor can they saturate all possible forms of mutual rapport.

Hjelmslev’s notion of prelogic rests thus on 1) vagueness (i.e. one or more members can saturate up to the entirety of the logical zone – an “extreme participation” represented by the correlate \(A = a+b+c\)), 2) participation (if members do share at least one of their respective variants), 3) the ensuing type of correlation – i.e. the so-called participative opposition \([a : a \text{ vs. } \text{non-}a]\)\(^{22}\), which reformulates Lévy-Bruhl conception of “participation”, that is the mystical link which is indifferent towards the logical principle of (non)contradiction. Furthermore, prelogic (namely the domain of participative oppositions and of mutual permeability) and logic (the domain of exclusion and refinement obtained by separating and isolating qualities) are both said to derive from the sublogical ground of language, which represents its capability of giving form to whatsoever purport, including, as said, intellectual, imaginative, emotive, perceptual material.

As a matter of facts, in its early years, the conceptual-zone was said to represent the category’s semantic ground, the *Grundbedeutung* which is always associated to whatsoever morphological category; some general implications are shown below:

1. a *Grundbedeutung* is said to be always, synchronically present: according to Hjelmslev, there are no “void” categories just as there is neither a diachronic process of semantic-weakening nor a “syntactisation” of linguistic elements;

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\(^{21}\) And yet, Hjelmslev’s reception of Karcevskij’s ideas is far from being linear and Hjelmslev’s own reformulation is far from being clear and straightforward: we lack space to provide a complete discussion of the topic, for which see Cigana 2014a.

\(^{22}\) In his *Résumé*, Hjelmslev distinguishes between “participation” and “simple correlation”: his first formalisation \((a \text{ vs. } a + \text{non-}a)\) is nowhere to be found. We have tried to give possible reasons for this in Cigana 2014a.
2. *Grundbedeutungen* are said to depend from human *psychological* (thus always *actual*) need of communication, which in turn presupposes a relatively stable and uniform semiological system;

3. particular usages of grammatical categories are apparently irregular or “illogical” since their corresponding *Grundbedeutungen* are deep, collective representations, tapped subconsciously by speakers who are usually far from being completely aware of categories’ profound semantic values. Linguists’ task of finding these latter can be as difficult as speakers’ attempt of proving the motivation of their *actes de parole*.

On this basis of this principle, which at a later stage was somewhat changed, Hjelmslev is able to formulate a proportion between number of members within categories and quality of their mutual correlations, that is the different ways in which they occupy (or insist on) some or all the fields of such a sublogical zone.

It is worth noting that although “participation” was conceived as an *formal*, albeit semantically-grounded way to describe the internal distribution of grammatical categories and to explain linguistic phenomena such as syncretism, implication and neutralisation (both on the content and on the expression plane) in compliance to the dictum “language for language’s sake”, at a later stage Hjelmslev seems to extend its pertinence to the study of substance[^23] and to specific phonetic-physiological or psychological facts, including Menzerath’s coarticulation (Hjelmslev 1943b: 10-11) or synaesthesia (Hjelmslev 1954: 179):

Nous supposons que ce principe vaut pour toute substance et pour tout niveau, et qu’on est partout en présence de catégories mutuellement solidairees […] et se définit comme composée d’un élément provenant de chacune d’entre elles : toute catégorie est représentée par un de ses membres dans n’importe quelle unité (Hjelmslev 1954: 181-182).

In this way, Hjelmslev seems to reintegrate those genetic, substantial (psychological, semantic, phonetic, acoustic) aspects that were slowly, yet only apparently excluded from the strict formal domain. In our opinion, focusing on the “genetic issues” concerning the development of “participation” allows some central difficulties of this theory to be sketched out more clearly, or, at least, not to be hastily neglected[^24]. The debate of the 2nd ICL summarized somewhat the issues concerning 1930’s general linguistics and constituted not only Hjelmslev’s theoretical background but rather its decisive drive towards participative theory.

4. *From scholar to scholar, from school to school*

[^23]: We would like to prevent a misunderstanding: from the passage we refer to, it seems that solidarity (and thus participation) between categories is the mark of substance, while reciprocity and selection are the mark of form. But formal analysis demands glossemes too to be established through solidarity (and thus participation) as a base of analysis (“les taxèmes sont après coup analysés en glossemes dont les catégories sont par définition mutuellement solidairees” Hjelmslev 1954: 181, but cf. also the very definition of “glossemes” given in *PTL*: 100).

[^24]: For instance: the interconnection between formal and substantial level of analysis, the link between a category’s subdivision into taxemes and glossemes and their semantic interpretation, and so on.
We would like to spend one last word about the diffusion of the notion of “participation” within Copenhagen’s linguistic circle. Participation may indeed be understood as one of Hjelmslev’s main heritage-ideas which had its own (short) period of glory – between 1930 and 1960, it was discussed and exploited mainly in applicative studies by Hjelmslev’s collaborators and scholars:

H.J. Uldall himself was deeply concerned with participative correlations as a way to “to compute so to speak all possible values for categories valid for all possible linguistic worlds” (Canger, Gregersen 2001: 48) – although his point of view was somewhat criticised by Hjelmslev himself (cf. BCLC VIII-XXXI: 76-77), this latter apparently shared his general idea, as the presence of participation within the “Universal Component” of the Résumé seems to show.

K. Togeby discussed the very idea of participation in his well-known paper Theodor Kalepky et les oppositions participatives (1968b); he even tried to expand its rules in his Structure immanente de la langue française (1965), in which he nevertheless adopt sort of a continual subdivision of extensive and intensive terms which is quite distant from Hjelmslev’s principles of dimensional analysis.

J. Holt was probably the first who studied the grammatical category of aspect exploiting Hjelmslev’s theory so well (although adopting an alternative, not exactly corresponding notational system) that in the Prolegomena Hjelmslev himself quoted Holt’s work Études d’aspect (1943) as a theoretical reference alongside his own La Catégorie des Cas.

H.C. Sørensen (1949a) studied the category of aspect with particular regards to its semantic interpretation in the light of the “concrete category” of space; he even discussed the possibilities of reconciling both glossematic, participative perspective and markedness point of view concerning the structure of the category of case (cf. Sørensen 1949b).

Lastly, in 1969 U. Canger utilised Hjelmslev’s idea concerning taxemes’ analysis in her PhD work on the structure of Maidu language.

We could thus say that, born within a so-called “interscholastic” thought on the crucible of the three schools of Prague, Paris and Geneva, Hjelmslev’s idea of “participative oppositions” seems to constitute a theory within a theory, that is a particular section within glossematics which had determined its own – if limited – scholastic trend.

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